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History is full of disastrous events in which citizens and responders were not prepared to respond properly or were ignorant of the full magnitude of the situation. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 , and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, each are examples of those events.
Each of those events provided significant lessons concerning response and recovery that ultimately drove procedural and organizational changes at all levels of government. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the lead federal agency for disaster incident management, was criticized for its poor performance during these catastrophic events.
Specifically, FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina was described as slow. The agency was deemed unable to coordinate efforts with other federal, private sector, and volunteer organizations because FEMA lacked a Common Operating Picture (COP) to provide situational awareness.
1 It could also be argued that the federal government response to Katrina failed well before the storm made landfall because people and resources were neither positioned nor postured properly before the hurricane hit shore. Once the storm struck the Gulf coast, federal, state, and local governments were immediately overwhelmed, and were unable to comprehend the essential aspects of the situation. Because FEMA did not understand that every disaster "is rich in unique episodes" 2 the agency's response was less than ideal.
For disaster relief to be effective there must be a common understanding of what situational information is needed and how that information is displayed and how it is achieved.
The emergency response community understands situational awareness to mean information gathered from a number of sources that, when communicated to emergency managers and 1
The White House, "Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned," http://georgewbush whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/ (accessed October 25, 2011). That system provided the structure for incident management as it relates to doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, and processes needed for effective operations. That structure supported efficient collaboration at all levels facilitated by a COP. Although NIMS provided the template, it
was not an operational incident management or resource allocation plan. The system assigned disaster coordination responsibilities to the FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). 4 The FCO is responsible for the timely delivery of federal assistance to the state and local governments, individual victims, and the private sector. The FCO is also responsible for obtaining and maintaining situational awareness at the tactical level to drive federal operations within the Joint Field Office (JFO) in support of the state. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, although key staff had been identified, the JFO was not setup at the outset because a presidential disaster declaration was pending. Although the delay in establishing a JFO played a role in the slow response, FEMA did not have a comprehensive COP in place that could facilitate situational awareness and a truly coordinated response.
5
The fact that situational awareness within the affected area was not achieved, coupled with numerous competing stovepipe systems, contributed to the system failure. The FCO clearly stated in the Katrina Lesson Learned report that local emergency officials found it difficult or impossible to establish an understanding of the environment because they lacked the ability to communicate with federal officials. Having a comprehensive COP would have enabled local response officials to direct operations, manage assets, obtain situational awareness, and generate requests for federal assistance. 6 Because FEMA was passive, and unable to effectively communicate with responders to understand the magnitude of the incident, the demand for emergency services exceeded FEMA's standard response capabilities and methods. Decisionmaking at all levels suffered because emergency managers lacked a functioning comprehensive COP. Emergency managers need the ability to know and understand the hazard, the terrain, and the available response capability, in a format that supports comprehension. Situational awareness alone does not ensure success; it is the sharing of the information that supports a truly coordinated response. If the benefits of a COP are so blatantly obvious, why has the federal government not created a comprehensive COP for tactical responses to disasters?
The question is not simple because disaster response involves numerous decision-makers at various levels of government. These decision-makers have both special and common information needs. The decision-makers have unique individual responsibilities and are accountable to state and local authorities. The mechanics of producing a COP is not an obstacle.
A COP is feasible from a software perspective, as a number of agencies have successfully implemented such a tool to include the Department of Defense. Because a COP is intended to provide a common understanding of a situation and to support timely decision-making, determining why it has been hard for FEMA to develop a comprehensive COP involved research in several other areas. First and foremost, it was necessary to determine the authority and responsibilities that govern state, local, and federal decision-making. A COP must provide information related to a decision-makers authority and responsibilities. 
FEMA Today
In an effort to answer the question of why the federal government has not implemented a comprehensive COP it is important to understand FEMA, the primary federal disaster response agency. What must be known is how FEMA manages disasters today without a comprehensive COP. Despite FEMA's inability to implement a COP it has not ignored the importance of awareness, cooperation and collaboration with all echelons. Over the past several years, because of the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA), FEMA has striven to improve its service to the nation on a number of levels. of all parts of society has become more challenging. This challenge drove the establishment of the Whole Community approach to emergency management. This approach presents a foundation for increasing individual preparedness and engaging community members who are vital partners in enhancing the resiliency and security of our nation. The Whole Community approach is not intended to be all encompassing or focused on any specific phase of emergency management or level of government. The approach does not direct specific actions or require communities or emergency managers to adopt certain protocols. Rather, it provides an overview of core principals, key themes, and pathways for action. In congressional testimony, the Administrator of FEMA described today's reality as follows, "Government can and will continue to serve disaster survivors. However, we fully recognize that a government centric approach to disaster management will not be enough to meet the challenges posed by a catastrophic incident. That is why we must fully engage our entire societal capacity."
11 As a concept, Whole Community is a means by which residents, emergency managers, practitioners and community leaders understand the needs of their communities. In doing this they are able to determine the best ways to organize and strengthen their assets, capacities, and interests. This approach builds partnerships and promotes collaboration and information sharing at all levels. 
COP Development
DHS recognized the need for a national secure web-based portal that provided a COP for those entities engaged in the homeland security mission. FEMA attempted to use this system as a comprehensive COP but found it did not meet the specific tactical needs of disaster response. The
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) was established to provide a secure and collaborative information-sharing environment. This tool supports federal, state, local emergency responders, and private sector communities within a homeland security situation. HSIN is a means to share critical information with other jurisdictions and to plan and request resources.
HSIN offers its users a variety of situational awareness tools such as a COP, real-time collaboration and instant messaging. The HSIN document library provides daily and periodic reports from its participants and thereby, enables participants to fuse threat related information.
14 DHS set lofty goals for the HSIN program, one of which was to share relevant and vetted homeland security information at all levels of government and the private sector.
The central goal of HSIN is to ensure that HSIN becomes a key component of the daily business processes of homeland security partners. The evidence suggests that HSIN faces significant challenges that it must overcome if it is to reach its full potential. Most importantly, information sharing is not limited to the 14 components of the federal government and law enforcement agencies but reaches down the chain to the front line responders.
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Additionally, there are strategic, programmatic, and operational challenges which are unrelated to the core system technology. Strategic issues revolve around the ability to attract and retain membership, being able to generate relevant actionable intelligence that supports situational awareness, demonstrating system value, and creating a cultural shift from "need to know" to "need to share."
The programmatic concerns focus on policies and guidelines surrounding the acquisition, use and retention of community data, and participating agency information validation. Finally, the operational challenges to keep participants using the system are those regarding building trust, standardization and customization, technological growth capability, and interoperability.
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Despite the published capabilities of the HSIN system, very few emergency responders used the system in the midst of Hurricane Katrina to gain situational awareness. Reports of lessons learned from the hurricane indicated agencies such as the National Guard and Eighth
Coast Guard District Command Center opted not to use HSIN or was unaware of its existence.
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Critical reviews of the system indicate the system lacked adequate user guidance, the users had received no user training, the data portal was hard to locate and ineffective as a storage location.
System users were confused, and did not understand the role of HSIN or how to share information. 18 FEMA now limits use of this system to planning for potential man-made disasters and management of internal and national level exercise activity. After FEMA encountered the challenges associated with HSIN it recognized the need for a disaster specific system that could easily be used by the emergency management community. In October 2007, FEMA began using the real time information sharing computer-based software Emergency Management Information Management System (EMIMS) that would serve as a single repository for disaster information. 19 This system was to provide decision-makers a broad picture of response actions and needs during a national crisis. EMIMS was intended to enhance decisionmaking. The EMIMS was to serve as the FEMA COP, affording all echelon levels the ability to share situational and operational knowledge during incidents, thereby, improving collaboration with partners to make smart well-informed decisions. Although EMIMS was an off-the-shelf technology, it supported the operating platform for the Geospatial Information System (GIS) that allowed for a visual depiction and facilitated easy development of standardized reports during steady state or disaster operations. Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with state and local partners provided the mechanism to share this information and to access existing state web based systems. However, in 2009 it was determined the system was not capable of integrating the plethora of state systems currently in place. Consequently, FEMA officials decided to abandon the EMIMS program.
In the wake of disestablishing EMIMS, FEMA leadership recognized the need to provide the watch centers doctrinal guidance pertaining to standardization and reporting requirements.
FEMA leadership established essential reporting requirements for watch officers and analysts and provided a standard basic reporting format. suggests that doctrine is the result of an examination and interpretation of the available evidence.
Additionally, it implies that the interpretation is subject to change should new evidence be introduced. The word "best" connotes a standard, a guide for those who conduct the business of emergency management. 30 FEMA doctrine pays appropriate attention to the relationship between agency doctrine, tactics, and strategy. Strategy in its simplest terms is a broad perspective on how to use resources to achieve a goal. Tactics is the deployment of forces in some specific instance.
Doctrine provides the principles that guide how responding forces will be used. FEMA emphasizes well-developed doctrine within an emergency management construct.
Doctrine is critical to operations because it reduces the need for leaders and decision-makers to communicate detailed instructions. Effective doctrine explains how to respond to disasters based on past experience and an educated forecast of what lies ahead. 32 In the absence of tasking and communications, a subordinate who acts in accordance with doctrine has a better probability of conforming with his superior's desires than he would otherwise. In a chaotic response environment, doctrine has a cohesive effect on multi-agency responders. It promotes mutually understood terminology, relationships, responsibilities, and processes and thus, frees the leader to focus on the overall response operation. FEMA's experience is the principle source of FEMA doctrine. The doctrine is a collection of those things that have generally been successful in the past. The repeated successes or failures of disaster response over time are generalized into beliefs that will be relevant to the present and the future. 33 Because not all past experience is relevant to the present or potentially even the future there is no guarantee that what is relevant for FEMA today will remain relevant, hence its doctrine is continually growing and changing. Doctrine provides a bridge or common thread leading from the past to the present and future. 34 It is a commonly understood and shared framework that sets the structure in which specific operations can be planned and executed. The framework is needed if a comprehensive COP is to be effective.
FEMA has identified that emergency managers today need doctrine to effectively conduct operations. While there is some validity in the adage of "adapt and overcome," emergency responders cannot make everything up as they go. It is necessary to rely on the 32 Clinton J. Ancker III and Michael D. Burke, "The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection," Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare, http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume1/october_2003/10_03_1.html (accessed December 30, 2011). 33 Drew, "Military Doctrine." 34 Tritten, "Naval Perspectives for Military Doctrine Development." foundational components of doctrine such as the principles previously discussed. This is not to say that FEMA does not expect emergency responders to adapt or modify the existing principles to address and solve unique problems. As the best way to conduct emergency management operations, FEMA doctrine provides a standard against which to measure effectiveness. Given that there are a number of situational factors that keep responders from doing things the best way; doctrine can still support analysis of successes and failures. These successes and failures drive the change and development of doctrine. However, despite FEMA's effort to establish applicable doctrinal resources to support response operations it has not facilitated the implementation of a comprehensive COP.
Information Access
The Constitution of the United States recognizes the general police powers of the states. 
Diverse Contextual Perspectives
If a picture is worth a thousand words, then applying this old adage to the topic at hand begs the question does the comprehensive COP articulate the same thousand words to each observer? 41 The most frequent rationale for a COP is the belief that a graphic representation multi-agency use of a COP. They contend that operating within a virtual environment could add ambiguity to the decision-making process, because the contextual understanding differs at each echelon. It is refined further in that there may be a number of non-verbal social cues missed and or processes that could get lost in the COP. Because of this, there is a need for a mechanism to check understanding and agreement across organizations to aid comprehension. 43 Within FEMA the watch center analyst is responsible for data analysis and for assessing the relevance of the information and for reporting his findings. It is expected that the state and local authorities will enter raw data into the COP system for federal interpretation. Doctrinal support is necessary to guide the analyst in their interpretation and assessment of raw information.
Research indicates that if an agency intends to implement a comprehensive COP as a means to replace the common communications architecture, the interagency cooperation will suffer due to the lack of common understanding of the environment. While the COP is designed to represent the information in a format that is understandable, the interpretation of the information is often different. Furthermore, in the absence of face to face interaction the ability to resolve potential jurisdictional or decisional conflicts is significantly diminished. 44 A key obstacle that FEMA has with implementing a comprehensive COP is the contextual understanding of the data, based on where within the organization the observer or decision maker works (federal, state, and local level). Everyone views things differently based on a number of factors such as experience, organizational role, and socio-cultural influences such as beliefs and values to name a few. In his book Beyond the Information Given, Jerome Bruner discusses veridicality, which refers to the degree that an observer's perception of a scene is accurate and predictive. People categorize what they observe based on experiences and familiarity with that which is being 43 Human Factors Integration Defence Technology Centre, "Common Operating Pictures and Their Potential for Multi-Agency Work,"http://www.hfidtc.com/research/multi/multi-reports/phase 2/HFIDTC-2-3-1-4-4-common-op-pictures.pdf (accessed November 19, 2011) . 44 Ibid. observed. 45 In pondering this issue it is useful to consider a lesson in observation and perception taught in basic psychology. Several people are tasked to observe a party then describe it. After While an operational commander might need to assume tactical control of the response, his staff cannot properly inform him sufficiently about the situation and context to permit effective command and control. 48 The absence of information management above the tactical level puts the decision maker in a position of responding to data rather than exercising command and control based on a common understanding of the environment, which is typical. However, that may not always be the case but certain steps need to be taken to prevent responding to data; e.g., involving the FEMA liaison or IMAT in the decision process. The contextual understanding presents a real challenge surrounding the implementation and use of a comprehensive COP. The decision-maker needs to stay in his lane when exercising command and control. The success of the COP is dependent upon the implementation of data management discipline since technological systems require doctrine, standardization and training to provide its foundation.
Everyone relies on technology and emergency managers are no different as they attempt to stream live video, track commodities and pre-determine community impacts. Emergency managers must be cautious, however, not to become so engrained in technology and modern conveniences that they lose sight of the mission. All the conceivable technology in the world will never replace the trust emergency managers will lose if they forget their primary responsibility to save and protect the citizens. Blindly assuming that technology is the answer to any problem can be costly and potentially risky. If the decision to implement a comprehensive COP is made, it should be developed on a solid theoretical model of information management to facilitate understanding, sense making, knowledge creation, and decision-making at the tactical level. As previously stated, a COP is an integrated system that takes situational awareness inputs to support collaborative decision-making and attempts to produce a consistent situational picture and common understanding. This system provides everyone within the chain of command (strategic, operational, and tactical) the same ability to display a picture that ultimately supports their specific information needs. Maximizing the capability of the COP provides responders, decision-makers, and everyone in between all the necessary information they require to respond to a disaster through a tailored visual depiction. When a major disaster occurs, it is critical for the supporting emergency response agencies to manage their vital information effectively to provide a timely response. However, because the visual depiction within a COP can be manipulated to meet agency specific needs, collaborative agency decision-making is difficult because the environment is being viewed differently.
To understand the complexity of implementing a comprehensive COP, it is important to evaluate how some agencies successfully implemented COP systems. This comparison shows the leadership relationship between the users of the COP and the purpose for its implementation.
Specifically, this highlights the concept that a COP may only be common to that community of interests that operates within a given sphere. Each sphere, further, has a single commander to maximize effectiveness of command and control.
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Over the past 10 years, the discussion of collaboration between government agencies has grown from a terrorism-centric focus to one that encompasses an all hazards approach. The use of a COP is one tool available to agencies to close the information sharing and collaboration gap. There are also a number of other concerns with the use of a comprehensive COP that are related to contextual understanding and these concerns cannot be ignored. The emergency response system lacks a common language and common data analysis procedures. The differences are driven by the different responsibilities and requirements of federal, state, and local responders. Research shows that today's state information systems use the same concept to manage emergency data as is used to manage physical assets. Information is collected and put in a storage place where it can be easily accessed. The COP essentially becomes a warehouse for large amounts of information, much of which is (1) poorly organized and validated, (2) difficult to search, and (3) of marginal relevance to the decision maker. 56 As a result, these information warehouses become useless to the decision maker and their staff because they are unable to find what they need in a timely manner. Knowledge management becomes more difficult when multiple agencies share the COP and numerous entities enter data into the system. Each of these entities depends on the other to enter data that is relevant, timely and accurate.
Additionally, because government officials believe that advances in technology provide a more detailed picture of events, today's leaders are expected to make decisions that respond precisely to the emergency's requirements regardless of the disaster's context. 58 Given the number of federal, state, and local officials involved in disaster response, the variety of data needs and decision concerns, and pressure to mitigate damage and save lives quickly, friction between decision-makers is unavoidable. If operating in a totally virtual environment, with limited human-to-human contact, will impede resolving conflicts over is the allocation and use of emergency resources. A COP can inform a decision-maker but it cannot resolve differences that arise between federal, state, and local responders. This highlights the overall importance of in person collaboration and communication. Currently the liaison officer sufficiently fills this role by personally representing the views of his agency; FEMA plans to continue this practice. 59 An organization needs to be clear about the purpose of the COP. Is the COP an aid to the current decision-making process or will it replace the current communication architecture all together. In the latter, the opportunity to check understanding and agreement of intended actions across echelon levels would be lost. The COP could lead to improved response performance, in terms of more rapid dissemination of incident information and intent, but decision-making and conflict resolution would be degraded. 
Conclusion

